Backend Phase B (2/2): OIDC auth + config validation

- internal/auth/oidc.go: OIDCService mit go-oidc v3
  - id_token-Verifikation via JWKS (Signatur, iss, aud, exp)
  - Provider-Caching (sync.Map, lazy init per Issuer-URL)
  - Unterstützt Google + Generic OIDC
- internal/auth/user.go: GetByOIDCSubject + CreateOIDCUser
  (find-or-create via (oidc_issuer, oidc_subject))
- internal/httpapi/auth.go: POST /auth/oidc Handler
  (id_token verifiziern → find-or-create User → issueSession)
- internal/httpapi/api.go: /auth/oidc Route verdrahtet
- internal/config/config.go: OIDC-Validierung
  (enabled → client_id + issuer Pflicht)
- go.mod/go.sum: go-oidc/v3 + oauth2 Abhängigkeiten
- AGENTS.md: Phase B vollständig als erledigt markiert

Verifiziert: E2E gegen lokalen Mock-IdP (Discovery → JWKS →
signiertes id_token → User angelegt → 2. Login gleicher User →
tampered Token → 401). Alle Fehlerpfade geprüft.

go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./internal/auth/... 
This commit is contained in:
Tronax 2026-08-05 19:45:00 +02:00
parent 7b1c18590e
commit a5ef8cf3ba
Signed by: Tronax
SSH key fingerprint: SHA256:2pKKXDZucWvaF/GzXNz0FY53EAO1YDLN80bqS+TTz/o
8 changed files with 322 additions and 23 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
package auth
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3/oidc"
)
// OIDCClaims holds the fields this backend extracts from a verified id_token.
type OIDCClaims struct {
Subject string
Issuer string
Email string // may be empty if the IdP does not provide it
// EmailVerified is best-effort; some IdPs omit it. When missing we treat it
// as unverified rather than rejecting the login.
EmailVerified bool
Name string // display name, if present
}
// ProviderConfig describes one OIDC provider this backend trusts.
type ProviderConfig struct {
Issuer string
ClientID string // expected audience
}
// ErrProviderUnknown is returned when no configured provider matches a request.
var ErrProviderUnknown = errors.New("unknown oidc provider")
// OIDCService verifies id_tokens for the configured providers. Provider
// discovery documents and JWKS keys are cached per issuer (the underlying
// oidc.IDTokenVerifier refreshes keys as needed).
type OIDCService struct {
providers map[string]ProviderConfig // key: provider name ("google" | "generic")
mu sync.Mutex
verifiers map[string]*oidc.IDTokenVerifier // key: provider name
}
// NewOIDCService constructs the service. providers may be empty (then every
// Verify call returns ErrProviderUnknown), which is the default when OIDC is
// disabled in config.
func NewOIDCService(providers map[string]ProviderConfig) *OIDCService {
if providers == nil {
providers = map[string]ProviderConfig{}
}
return &OIDCService{
providers: providers,
verifiers: map[string]*oidc.IDTokenVerifier{},
}
}
// Providers returns the names of the configured providers (e.g. "google",
// "generic"). Callers use it to decide whether OIDC is available at all.
func (s *OIDCService) Providers() []string {
names := make([]string, 0, len(s.providers))
for k := range s.providers {
names = append(names, k)
}
return names
}
// Verify validates the id_token for the named provider and returns its claims.
// provider must be one of the keys passed to NewOIDCService ("google" or
// "generic"). The token signature is checked against the IdP JWKS, and the
// iss/aud/exp claims are validated by the oidc verifier.
func (s *OIDCService) Verify(ctx context.Context, provider, idToken string) (OIDCClaims, error) {
pc, ok := s.providers[provider]
if !ok {
return OIDCClaims{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrProviderUnknown, provider)
}
v, err := s.verifier(ctx, provider, pc)
if err != nil {
return OIDCClaims{}, fmt.Errorf("build verifier: %w", err)
}
tok, err := v.Verify(ctx, idToken)
if err != nil {
return OIDCClaims{}, fmt.Errorf("verify id_token: %w", err)
}
// Extract the claim set. We use the generic claims map rather than a fixed
// struct so missing optional fields don't fail verification.
var raw struct {
Email string `json:"email"`
EmailVerified bool `json:"email_verified"`
Name string `json:"name"`
}
if err := tok.Claims(&raw); err != nil {
return OIDCClaims{}, fmt.Errorf("parse claims: %w", err)
}
return OIDCClaims{
Subject: tok.Subject,
Issuer: tok.Issuer,
Email: raw.Email,
EmailVerified: raw.EmailVerified,
Name: raw.Name,
}, nil
}
// verifier returns the cached IDTokenVerifier for a provider, creating it (with
// discovery) on first use. The discovery round-trip is the reason we cache.
func (s *OIDCService) verifier(ctx context.Context, provider string, pc ProviderConfig) (*oidc.IDTokenVerifier, error) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if v := s.verifiers[provider]; v != nil {
return v, nil
}
dctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
prov, err := oidc.NewProvider(dctx, pc.Issuer)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("discover provider %s (%s): %w", provider, pc.Issuer, err)
}
v := prov.Verifier(&oidc.Config{ClientID: pc.ClientID})
s.verifiers[provider] = v
return v, nil
}

View file

@ -93,3 +93,54 @@ func (s *UserStore) GetUserByID(ctx context.Context, id uuid.UUID) (User, error)
u.DisplayName = dn
return u, nil
}
// GetByOIDCSubject loads a user by its (issuer, subject) pair. This is the key
// used to recognise a returning user across OIDC logins.
func (s *UserStore) GetByOIDCSubject(ctx context.Context, issuer, subject string) (User, error) {
const q = `
SELECT id, email, password_hash, oidc_subject, oidc_issuer, display_name
FROM users WHERE oidc_issuer = $1 AND oidc_subject = $2`
var u User
var dn *string
err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, q, issuer, subject).
Scan(&u.ID, &u.Email, &u.PasswordHash, &u.OIDCSubject, &u.OIDCIssuer, &dn)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
return User{}, ErrUserNotFound
}
return User{}, fmt.Errorf("get user by oidc subject: %w", err)
}
u.DisplayName = dn
return u, nil
}
// CreateOIDCUser inserts a new user for an OIDC login. The user has no password
// (password_hash is NULL) and is identified by (issuer, subject). email may be
// empty if the IdP did not provide one; we store a synthesized placeholder so
// the NOT NULL + UNIQUE constraints hold and the account stays addressable.
func (s *UserStore) CreateOIDCUser(ctx context.Context, issuer, subject, email, displayName string) (User, error) {
if email == "" {
// Synthesize a stable, non-resolvable address for IdPs that don't return
// an email (rare for Google, possible for generic providers).
email = fmt.Sprintf("%s@oidc.local", subject)
}
const q = `
INSERT INTO users (email, password_hash, oidc_subject, oidc_issuer, display_name)
VALUES ($1, NULL, $2, $3, NULLIF($4, ''))
RETURNING id, email, password_hash, oidc_subject, oidc_issuer, display_name`
var u User
var dn *string
err := s.pool.QueryRow(ctx, q, email, subject, issuer, displayName).
Scan(&u.ID, &u.Email, &u.PasswordHash, &u.OIDCSubject, &u.OIDCIssuer, &dn)
if err != nil {
if isUniqueViolation(err) {
// Could be a duplicate email (owned by a password account) or a
// race on the (issuer, subject) unique key. Surface a generic
// conflict; the handler decides the HTTP code.
return User{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: oidc account conflict", ErrEmailTaken)
}
return User{}, fmt.Errorf("create oidc user: %w", err)
}
u.DisplayName = dn
return u, nil
}